*947 III. THE MAJORITY'S STRATEGIC CHOICES
A. Traditional International Law: The Road Not Taken The majority could have accomplished either of its possible goals, ensuring that Dr. Alvarez Machain was tried in the United States or reversing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of treaty violations, using traditional international law. Foreign abduction and arrest outside of an extradition treaty would admittedly violate international law. However, the existence of a treaty implicates an interested third party, the government of the asylum state. The majority could have argued that while abductions outside of a treaty violate international, and by incorporation, American law, there is no defense or remedy for the individual. To reach that result, however, the Rauscher rule, which holds that violation of a clear treaty provision may preclude jurisdiction and result in repatriation, would have to be sidestepped. But avoiding Rauscher would have been straightforward. The Court would have continued the century-long pattern of confining Rauscher to its facts and reading international law to preclude the claims -however meritorious-of abductees, reserving the treaty grievance for the Mexican Government, which could seek resolution through diplomatic avenues. [FN42] The result would have been a short opinion conceding a violation of the treaty and international law but relying on the lack of an individual remedy to reinstate American jurisdiction. [FN43] Both foreign policy realists and human rights activists have reason to challenge these traditional arguments. Every legal system contains wrongs without remedies-violations either too trivial, new, or complex for judicial remedy. But a system that consistently responds to violations of law with the excuse of a lack of remedies should prompt skepticism. Traditionalists assert that malefactor states which refuse to make adequate reparation after diplomatic and political protest face the stigma of condemnation by the world community. While this does happen occasionally, as Libya discovered after its refusal to extradite two officials allegedly involved in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, stigmas and weak sanctions are, at best, sporadic responses, and states often stonewall after violating international law. Traditional international law's failure to provide remedies for victims of contumacious wrongdoers is only half the problem. Of equal concern is the absence of a principled distinction between cases where a remedy is obtained and those lacking a remedy. For example, the United States belatedly freed Sidney Jaffe, kidnapped from Canada by American bail bondsmen in 1981, [FN44] *948 and Germany eventually released Berthold Jacob-Salomon, who was snatched from Switzerland by the Nazis. [FN45] Under international law, these cases were neither stronger nor weaker than those of other abductees, including Eichmann, Ker, and Alvarez Machain, who were not released. Politics alone accounts for the different outcomes. Perhaps the accommodation of law to state power makes sense in the area of foreign abduction. But it should be stressed that the regime of international law is being bargained away. An aggrieved country will not enjoy a remedy as of right, but only if compliance benefits the offending country. It is unlikely, however, that the Alvarez-Machain majority avoided traditional international law because of the lack of effective remedies. On the contrary, using traditional reasoning offered the Court several advantages. First, casting its argument in terms of mainstream international law would probably have muffled some of the widespread anger provoked by the decision. Second, foreign relations authority would have been deferred to the Executive Branch, eliminating separation-of-powers concerns. Third, traditional international reasoning would have modified the Ker-Frisbie rule only slightly. Ker-Frisbie would still have applied in cases of domestic and international abduction not involving protests or treaties, and would not have been applicable only in cases featuring an extradition treaty, official abduction, and foreign protest. In cases where Ker-Frisbie did not apply, the outcome would have been assured nonetheless, albeit by denying the abductee a remedy under international law. Thus, traditional international law offered the Court its desired result, on familiar grounds and with safe consequences. Moreover, the theory dovetailed with recent case law, [FN46] and was endorsed by such prominent figures as former State Department Legal Advisor, Judge Abraham Sofaer. [FN47] Why the Court chose to argue affirmatively the unnecessary and problematic claim that no treaty violation had occurred rather than conceding such a violation is the principal surprise of Alvarez-Machain. [FN48] B. The Majority's Treatment of International Law The Court's conclusion that international law had not been breached required proving that neither the provisions of a binding treaty nor the equally binding norms of customary international law were violated. The Court addressed the treaty issue, albeit in startling fashion, but remained almost totally silent as to customary law. *949 1. Treaty interpretation after Alvarez-Machain. Apart from the "shocking" abduction itself, perhaps no feature of Alvarez-Machain attracted more criticism than the majority's startling conclusion that treaties create little more than policy options. [FN49] The Court held that the 1978 treaty between the United States and Mexico outlined only one possible procedure for rendition, extradition under the treaty; nothing in the treaty specifically disallowed employing means not mentioned in the treaty, including abduction. [FN50] One would never claim that, when a retailer's bill of sale does not explicitly prohibit breaking into his warehouse and taking additional items, the buyer is tacitly authorized to do so, but the court seemed to read precisely that meaning into the extradition treaty. Furthermore, the argument that broad foreign relations texts merely create policy options was not an isolated instance of interpretive whimsy. On the contrary, this argument has been successfully advanced over the past decade in several contexts, and the results have consistently strengthened the Executive Branch's discretionary power. [FN51] To some extent, the argument that extradition treaties do not exhaust the potential means of rendition is judicial sleight of hand. The Court failed to mention that the other means involve obtaining the consent of the asylum state. [FN52] Treaties neither address nor automatically preclude consensual bilateral rendition or unilateral action by the asylum state, such as voluntary surrender, expulsion, or deportation. While the majority is literally right in stating that the extradition treaty does not expressly preclude abduction, none of these scenarios is applicable to abduction over the active protest of the territorial state. How broad is the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico? It is as detailed as most modern extradition treaties, and far more detailed than the single-paragraph extradition provision interpreted in Rauscher. However, U.S. officials did not formally seek to extradite Alvarez Machain. Does the treaty apply nonetheless, excluding other, forcible means of rendition, such as abduction? Nothing in the treaty expressly forbids its own total negation. Actually, avoiding the treaty procedure in a case where it arguably ought to apply presents a somewhat nonfalsifiable claim, and there are few cases on point. [FN53] *950 Violation of Article 6 (double jeopardy) or Article 8 (capital punishment) is capable of proof. A breach of the entire treaty can only be argued by reference to the standard canons of treaty construction. Unfortunately, the standard methods of treaty construction do not yield a clear answer. The U.S.-Mexico treaty does not directly address alternative means of rendition, such as abduction, and neither the negotiating history nor the ratification process discloses the intent of the parties on this point. The amici to the Court and critics of the decision have argued that the intent of the treaty partners must have been to invoke respect for boundaries and state sovereignty and to eliminate border violence, fostering bilateral cooperation by prohibiting state-sponsored abduction. [FN54] In the aftermath of Alvarez Machain's acquittal, it is relevant that the likely purpose of Treaty Article 3 ("Evidence Required") was to prevent the rendition of suspects against whom only speculative evidence of criminal guilt existed. The Chief Justice imputed a different intent to the parties, asserting that because Mexico knew about both past abductions (from at least 1906) and the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, it was cognizant of American practice. Mexico's failure to insist upon or to insert a ban on abduction into the treaty showed that such a ban was not part of its bargain. [FN55] Consequently, inferring a ban would constitute an impermissible judicial amendment to the treaty. [FN56] However, not one of the more than one hundred bilateral American extradition treaties in force expressly forbids abduction. Even treaty partners that vigorously protest kidnapping incidents and seek to punish kidnappers assume that customary law and current extradition treaties already ban abductions. [FN57] But, as the majority recognized, universal silence cannot prove an affirmative claim. What, then, did the parties really intend? Mexico may have hoped that agreeing to extradite fugitives would lead its northern neighbor to ease, if not halt, the practice of abduction. For its part, the United States may have hoped for greater Mexican cooperation while reserving an asserted right to *951 abduct. Rather than precluding or permitting the practice, the two countries likely ignored abduction because of fundamental disagreements and fear that broaching the issue would scuttle treaty negotiations. If the United States and Mexico did deliberately side-step the issue, then both the majority and the dissent in Alvarez-Machain misleadingly interpreted the treaty. In fact, the treaty has no one intention to construe. The heart of the majority position is that, in the absence of legislative history or actual intent, the treaty ought to be interpreted literally, stripped of any context. Whatever is not forbidden is thus permitted-including, as Justice Stevens acidly noted, torture and execution. [FN58] This maxim, however, is not applicable to treaty construction. Nothing in the considerable international literature on treaty construction supports the view that extradition treaties are to be read so narrowly. Certain kinds of treaties, notably in the arms control area, are read narrowly to permit whatever is not clearly prohibited, but generally treaties are to be interpreted liberally. Customary international law, as viewed both in the writings of publicists such as Lord McNair [FN59] and in instruments such as the Vienna Convention on Treaties, [FN60] stresses the purpose of the treaty, its plain language, and good faith interpretation. [FN61] This extradition treaty, interpreted consistently with these customary canons, governs all bilateral rendition, [FN62] with the intent to facilitate cooperation in lieu of lawless alternatives.
The majority's literalist theory of treaty interpretation is implausible precisely because it ignores these widely accepted notions of treaty construction. The majority did not invent this literalist theory. It was advanced by a dissenting justice in 1886, [FN63] implied in a Justice Department opinion thirteen years ago, [FN64] and argued vigorously by the Department before the lower courts in Alvarez-Machain and Verdugo-Urquidez. [FN65] Now, even though endorsed by the Supreme Court majority, the theory fails to carry its weight. To my knowledge, no public supporter of the outcome in Alvarez-Machain has endorsed the majority's transparent, result-oriented reading of treaty construction. [FN66] *952 2. The substance of customary international law. While most of the reaction to Alvarez-Machain centered on its unusual handling of the extradition treaty, many in the international law community focused instead on the Court's treatment of customary international law. [FN67] That body of law contains not only canons for treaty interpretation, but also substantive norms regarding abduction. The Court virtually ignored this law, however, rejecting such an argument as backed "with only the most general of international law principles to support it," even if abduction "may be in violation of general international law principles." [FN68] What are these general principles, and what force do they have? Hornbooks teach that customary international law is valid and binding. Although practical questions about customary law exist-such as when new norms ripen into custom-there is no serious dispute as to its binding effects. And few question the bedrock norm of international law: Using force without consent in the territory of another sovereign is prima facie wrong. [FN69] But the norm precluding abduction as well as other extraterritorial force is only one applicable tenet. An equally potent customary norm permits jurisdiction and trial even after an irregular arrest: male captus, bene detentus (loosely translated: "improperly captured, properly detained") which in effect links the Ker-Frisbie rule to international law. There is ample support for male captus in mainstream international law, upon which the Court could have relied to reverse the lower courts. Using male captus, the majority would have conceded the illegality of the abduction but denied on international grounds that illegal rendition bars jurisdiction. [FN70] In fact, the failure to take the much anticipated next logical step attracted the interest of international lawyers. Male captus is seen in some quarters as a dangerous relic of a less enlightened era, which jeopardizes individual rights by permitting abductees like Alvarez Machain to stand trial. There is emerging support for the proposition that male captus either has been, or ought to be, repudiated in favor of a rule barring trial after abduction. [FN71] Even assuming for the sake of argument that international support for the male captus norm is eroding, the Court was still free to reason that although abduction and subsequent trials are both impermissible, American constitutional law nonetheless permits the Executive Branch to violate international law. This seemingly remarkable but widely accepted *953 rule of law is derived from The Paquete Habana, [FN72] decided almost one hundred years ago. In the case, Justice Gray noted in dicta that customary international law is to be applied "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision." [FN73] If the decision of the Executive Branch to abduct Alvarez Machain is deemed the controlling juridical act, then American law permits his trial after abduction. Specifying what and whose act might negate a customary rule under the Paquete Habana formula has presented American international and constitutional lawyers with one of their hardest tasks. This difficulty explains the references in the Alvarez-Machain amici briefs to whether the President or senior Executive Branch officials ordered or ratified the abduction. It also clarifies the discussion as to whether the abduction represented a unilateral Executive Branch reinterpretation of a ratified treaty, which would not be considered a "controlling" act. [FN74] Champions of congressional involvement in foreign affairs and human rights lawyers generally argue that the reference in Paquete Habana to "controlling" executive and legislative acts suggests that only certain executive acts can trump customary norms. Otherwise, these advocates maintain, courts must reject unreasonable executive determinations. [FN75] Hard-line supporters of an imperial presidency counter that almost any Executive Branch act authorizes the breach and supersession of customary international law. [FN76] Armed with that latter argument, the majority could have used customary law to its advantage. Yet the Alvarez-Machain majority resisted the temptation to utilize customary law or the Paquete Habana formula of controlling Executive Branch acts. [FN77] The majority concluded that customary international law was simply *954 too general for concrete application. [FN78] This dismissal of customary law disappointed various legal constituencies, ranging from the Reagan-Bush Justice Department to the human rights bar. By stressing state practice rather than ostensibly "general" customary principles, the majority lent legitimacy to all state practices, instead of state practices that are "accepted as law" [FN79] or "followed from a sense of legal obligation." [FN80] In other words, the majority's strategy trivialized customary norms and their bases of legitimacy.
3. Judicial marginalization of customary international law. More important than the response to any specific nonabduction norm is the majority's contemptuous attitude towards international law. The majority seems to disregard customary international law, treating it like a morganatic child of the legal system. This dismissive attitude goes beyond a single majority opinion and the attitudes of any particular justice. It is characteristic of American attitudes in most international law cases and of the reservations the Congress expresses in ratifying treaties and passing implementing legislation. The United States simply does not trust international law, particularly customary law. In contrast to modern American attitudes, early nineteenth century American jurists, such as Justice Story, Chief Justice Marshall, and their common law forbears, recognized the importance of international law-"the law of nations"-to our law and the reverence it should be given. [FN81] The contrast with post-World War II attitudes towards international law is stark, and helps to explain the reasoning of the Alvarez-Machain majority. One explanation for the diminished import of international law in American law involves the change in American power and self-confidence. America was a weak newcomer in a world of warring powers in the early nineteenth century. Any neutral body of rules that protected shipping, passage, and territorial integrity benefited the United States. As importantly, many early American leaders valued the law of nations because they viewed international relations as a system in which morality and right mattered. [FN82] As America ascended to superpower status, however, international law began to represent the feeble attempts of weak countries to restrain the strong. International law has also changed. The early nineteenth century law of nations was largely "unwritten." It was principally found in the writings of *955 the leading jurists, the "publicists," rather than in treaties. International law was part of a larger intellectual effort to present all law in scientific form: the law of nations, the law of nature, divine law, and municipal law. The law of nations sprang from the natural law premises of the Enlightenment. It was universal, reasonable, and part of a general moral framework. [FN83] But in recent decades, international law has looked very different, more positivistic, for two reasons. First, the number of state-generated instruments has exploded. Since 1945, the United Nations has registered some 30,000 bilateral and multilateral instruments. [FN84] Second, the growth in treaty law has substantially affected customary law, as evidence of customary law is drawn in part from these conventional instruments. The positivistic hue of this burgeoning international law has seemed to threaten American judges and legislators-especially the provisions addressing social and economic rights. Instead of the clear mora l principles of 1800, modern international law seems to represent the commands of rival sovereigns, grounded in the majoritarian politics of the U.N. and operating without the authority of the appropriate American institutions. [FN85] With these changes in international law, the aversion of American courts is hardly surprising.
[FN86] Cases like Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, [FN87] in which the Second Circuit relied on customary law to ground an action for state-sponsored foreign torture, and its progeny [FN88] may signal the resurgence of international law in America. But for the moment, at least, such cases are still exceptions. The forty year delay in ratifying the Genocide Convention, the refusal to ratify most human rights conventions, and the doctrine of nonself-executing treaties all illustrate the prevailing American distrust of international law. [FN89] The same skepticism of international norms and institutions anchored the American refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of International Justice in 1985-1986, [FN90] and it may have swayed the majority in Alvarez-Machain. *956 4. Limited deference to the Executive. Despite the majority's contemptuous view of treaty interpretation and international law, it unexpectedly used the extradition treaty to support a continuing role for the judiciary in American foreign relations law. In one sense, the Alvarez-Machain majority deferred to the Executive Branch, reasoning that inferring a no-trial-after-abduction clause would constitute a unilateral judicial amendment to the treaty, violating the separation of powers. [FN91] However, this version of institutional deference was incomplete and gave political branches-particularly the Young Turks in the Department of Justice-less than they wanted. The Alvarez-Machain majority disappointed the other branches by declining to hold that the Executive Branch has exclusive control over extraterritorial enforcement (particularly in the absence of statutory regulation), that the President has nonreviewable or inherent powers in the foreign arena, [FN92] or that trial after foreign abduction presents a "political question."
[FN93] Instead, the Court followed the judicial inclination to dance around the nonjusticiability rationale in the foreign relations area. This trend, apparent in such cases as Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, [FN94] involves the following choreographed steps: (1) acknowledging that deference to the political branches is the prevailing rule; (2) refusing to defer in this specific case, noting that the leading statement on deference to the political branches, Baker v. Carr, [FN95] does not require it; and (3) affirming the Executive Branch claims after looking at the case on its merits. The Executive Branch wins-not automatically, as it would without judicial scrutiny, but on the merits. The difference between deferring to executive discretion under a "political question" or some similar analysis, on one side, and a substantive holding in favor of the Executive Branch on the other, did not matter to Alvarez Machain, nor does it affect the general policy surrounding criminal abductions. In the short run, it is interesting in only a theoretical sense that the Court chose to remain an institutional "player" in the foreign arena by virtue of its competence to interpret treaties, given that the majority's reasoning relies on treaty avoidance. The difference between jurisdictional and substantive defeat for abductees and other claimants may, however, have a considerable political *957 impact. Dismissing a challenge on "political question" grounds forces claimants to resort to Congress, the ballot box, picket lines, television ads, and similar public forums. Democratic theory and separation-of-powers doctrine both suggest that the political branches and the public sphere are the appropriate forums for decisions on foreign relations policy issues. There is a correlation, however difficult to document, between the judiciary's consistent reluctance to rule on the merits of foreign policy and the emergence of a broad national consensus around such divisive issues as nuclear weapons testing [FN96] and deployment, [FN97] the Vietnam War, [FN98] and Central American policy.
[FN99] The political branches were able to treat those issues adequately. Foreign abduction, however, has few constituencies and little ability to find a public forum, particularly after the initial shock of isolated kidnappings dissipates. Thus, the Court had little choice but to accept its own competence to hear Alvarez Machain's case. The manner in which criminal defendants are brought to justice is a question close to the core of the judicial enterprise. [FN100] So the Court proceeded on the merits of the case, necessarily retreating from the full scope of the imperial presidency theory. Although the Court ultimately gave the Executive Branch carte blanche to enforce the law abroad, it fired a pea-shooter across the bow of executive authority by examining the substance of the treaty and addressing the case on its merits. The majority reasoned that although international law does not check executive enforcement abroad, there nevertheless remains a nominal role for the judiciary. This mixed conclusion may be disappointing in many quarters, but is probably not surprising to any student of post-war American thinking on international law.
C. Extraterritorial Policing, Extraterritorial Rights
The Alvarez-Machain majority doubtless recognized that basing its decision on international law would provoke these difficult questions about human rights norms and Executive Branch discretion. It apparently felt that the safer course involved risking the firestorm of criticism for the treaty-*958 avoidance doctrine and to let Ker-Fris bie explain away any remaining difficulties with foreign abduction. In using criminal procedure jurisprudence in this way, however, the majority had to address a second problem: whether rights apply abroad, regardless of their content at home. The majority could have reasoned that some constitutional claims did not apply to abduction abroad, based solely on the territorial scope, not the substance, of the asserted right. By choosing instead to reason along the lines of Ker-Frisbie, the Court made two distinct points: that the familiar no-divestiture-of-jurisdiction (Ker-Frisbie) rule applied, and that an analysis treating domestic (Frisbie) and foreign (Ker) acts alike was appropriate. The implications of this latter choice about rights and their reach should be examined carefully.
1. The extraterritoriality of rights. To whom do constitutional rights attach? They certainly apply to American citizens in America. This minimalist description, however, ignores the claims of different classes of noncitizens: the foreigner in America; the citizen abroad; the alien abroad. Two broad, admittedly imperfect paradigms are used to address these situations. [FN101] One model assumes that constitutional rights act as a check on governmental power; those facing the legal power of the American government have constitutional rights that constrain governmental action. Under the second model, only persons possessing sufficient contacts with the United States (i.e., physical presence or citizenship) can claim rights. In the first scenario, Alvarez Machain arguably has a claim against abduction. In the second, he clearly has none. The most recent Supreme Court analysis of the foreign reach of American rights firmly adopted the second, limited model of territoriality. Ironically, the case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, [FN102] involved an appeal by another defendant implicated in Guadalajara drug activities and the Camarena killing. Verdugo Urquidez was abducted from Mexico and held for several days in a Los Angeles jail while DEA agents searched his Mexican property without a warrant. A concurring justice granted that the warrantless search would have been unconstitutional had it occurred in the United States. [FN103] However, the Court, in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice, asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign searches. The Court argued that the applicability of a right abroad depends on constitutional text, history, and consequences. [FN104] Applying that test to the Fourth Amendment, the Chief Justice, joined by a plurality, argued that the right of "persons" to be secure in their homes was a territorial right that *959 applied only to "we the people," to persons and homes in America. [FN105] Our ideals may be a beacon to the world and a light unto the nations, but our constitutional rights cannot be imposed on neighbors. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the Constitution creates two worlds, America and terra incognita-and the Constitution applies only in America. Why did the Alvarez-Machain majority decline to use the Verdugo-Urquidez standard in addressing the constitutional issues of foreign abduction? The Verdugo-Urquidez test reflects the facts of Alvarez-Machain better than its own. Unlike Dr. Alvarez Machain, Rene Verdugo Urquidez did have a significant territorial link with America. He was within the United States at the time his asserted Fourth Amendment rights were violated. [FN106] Applying the Verdugo-Urquidez analysis to an abduction would mean that because a Mexican defendant in Mexico has no American rights to assert, then after abduction he has no grounds on which to attack the trial court's jurisdiction. In fact, a Verdugo-Urquidez analysis offered the majority considerably more than another way to reverse the lower courts. First, the social compact and territorial reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez would resonate, if superficially, across the political spectrum. [FN107] More importantly, Verdugo-Urquidez provides critical support for American law enforcement activities abroad. Although under the traditional view of territorial enforcement power each nation would exercise "jurisdiction to enforce" almost exclusively within its own boundaries, this is no longer an accurate description of American law enforcement activities. American customs officers greet the traveler at checkpoints in Caribbean airports, DEA agents pursue investigations in Mexico and other Latin American countries, and American military, customs, and DEA units assist in combing jungles for drug crops and laboratories. It is a brave new world of joint investigations and cooperative police work. San Diego and Tijuana alike are routine assignments for DEA "beat cops." The difficult question is not whether American law enforcement officials can, by right, enforce U.S. law in other countries. The presence of U.S. agents is typically authorized by the host government, [FN108] and even without *960 foreign authorization, then Assistant Attorney General William Barr concluded that the President has both statutory and inherent authority to send federal agents abroad. [FN109] The compelling new question concerns whose standards these extraterritorial American agents will follow. Under Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. agents in foreign countries should conform to local standards but not American constitutional law, a logic which defines "abroad" as a constitutional free-fire zone. Proponents of the Verdugo-Urquidez territoriality test emphasize the sovereignty of the host country, arguing that as guests, American officials should abide by their host's standards. [FN110] But that argument is disingenuous. Local standards are often less stringent than U.S. requirements, and local officials can be manipulated. Moreover, respect for other nations' sovereignty would require the United States to follow foreign rules that impede American interests. Verdugo-Urquidez should be considered a disaster precisely because it exempts the government's extraterritorial acts from constitutional constraints and oversight. Divorcing modern constitutional criminal procedure from extraterritorial American policing permits our agents to behave in a dubious fashion, and to act in concert with those lacking rules or scruples. Even where an activity is regulated by American statutes or departmental regulations, such as official torture, Verdugo-Urquidez permits U.S. officials to benefit from the zeal of local police officials. Thus, the Second Circuit permitted the prosecution of a Chilean national who had been brutally tortured by Chilean police and then escorted to New [FN113] As a result, the Court restricted the benefits which federal authorities could garner from state agents acting outside of the Fourth Amendment or the exclusionary rule. [FN114] Courts have similarly limited the government's ability to use evidence obtained by private persons, who are normally not restrained by the Fourth Amendment when they act at the behest of government officials. [FN115] But in the case of policing abroad, Verdugo-Urquidez allows U.S. officials to use the ill-gotten gains, including evidence and the arrest, of abusive conduct by foreign police officials. An even greater problem is the near impossibility of formulating a neutral account of the disputed incident, and thus of determining whether any departmental or statutory rules were violated. While comparable police abuses occur in the United States, courts and counsel can readily investigate such incidents. With extraterritorial policing, however, the alleged victims are invariably unable to prove to the satisfaction of an American court that torture or some other abuse occurred, that it was perpetrated by Americans, or that it was sufficiently egregious to allow redress. [FN116] No claimant has ever prevailed under the Toscanino exception, which concedes that a "complex of shocking governmental conduct might be sufficient to convert an abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a violation of due process." [FN117] While most allegations may be unfounded, it simply defies belief that in every instance, American extraterritorial policing is conducted within its ostensible regulatory framework. Most likely, the difficulties of establishing proof from a distance all but preclude the possibility of successfully proving extraterritorial police abuse. If so, the solutions are either to apply an exclusionary rule or to abandon the pretense of "meaningful" oversight. Verdugo-Urquidez opts for the latter.
2. The oversight problem and subject matter jurisdiction. The other major difficulty with employing a territoriality test to establish the scope of rights is the increasing number of foreign acts and individuals being brought within the reach of American justice. In addition to pursuing individuals abroad more systematically, [FN118] the criminalization of acts with *962 no territorial links to America is growing.
[FN119] The United States has criminalized such extraterritorial white-collar violations as antitrust, securities, and export and re-export control violations, [FN120] as well as violent acts like hijacking. [FN121] Indeed, the cases against Alvarez Machain and his alleged associates were predicated on the claim that U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction over them for crimes committed in Mexico. [FN122] There are many widely accepted international law theories under which foreign acts can be criminalized, allowing American law to reach more acts and more defendants. Foreign acts, such as hijacking a plane with A merican passengers, or killing a DEA agent, thus transform the entire world into a local precinct in which nearly all persons are fair game. Verdugo-Urquidez allows American law enforcement officers to search, abduct, and generally investigate an ever broadening range of targets. The expansion of the playing *963 field is precisely why limits must be set on American enforcement practices.
3. The reaffirmation of Ker. The Verdugo-Urquidez plurality holding that rights essentially end at the U.S. border is indefensible. It removes constitutional oversight and moral legitimacy from law enforcement, replacing them with discretionary Executive Branch power. It permits American jurisdictional and enforcement power to reach farther than American rights. [FN123] Nevertheless, Verdugo-Urquidez is "good law" and was available to the Court as it considered Alvarez-Machain. The majority instead relied on Ker-Frisbie and principles of treaty construction, bypassing the Verdugo-Urquidez analysis entirely.
[FN124] Why did the Alvarez-Machain Court abandon Verdugo-Urquidez's territoriality test in favor of Ker-Frisbie? In part, the Court may have intended to make a didactic point to the lower courts. Once the district and appellate courts opened the possibility of a treaty-breach exception to Ker-Frisbie, that door had to be closed decisively. Beyond that, the majority did not need the Verdugo-Urquidez territoriality test because Ker-Frisbie permitted jurisdiction after any improper arrest. Third, the broad Verdugo-Urquidez framework might actually have been insufficient to sustain jurisdiction over abductees, because the trial would be in America. Additionally, Verdugo-Urquidez allowed for the possibility that U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and others with "contacts" with the United States would be entitled to constitutional protection. Applying the Verdugo-Urquidez framework to abductions would undermine Frisbie by conferring constitutional rights on domestic abductees. That threat had to be disarmed. The larger issue of the extraterritorial policing cases was raised in Verdugo-Urquidez and remains unresolved by Alvarez-Machain. Should identical police behavior by American officials enforcing identical criminal provisions be treated differently when it occurs in Tijuana rather than San Diego? In this particular case, given current heightened extraterritorial policing, the Alvarez-Machain Court answered "no," using logic resembling a good news/bad news joke. The good news is that Alvarez-Machain does not rest on a destructive us versus them distinction. The bad news is that neither of us has constitutional rights against police-sponsored abduction.
IV. THE DISSENT'S RELIANCE ON THE TREATY
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion also takes a wrong turn into treaty analysis. His hand was forced, in part, because both the lower courts and the majority relied on treaty grounds. But the real attraction of the treaty argument was the apparent foreclosure of all other lines of argument by earlier Court rulings. Justice Stevens was of course free to open those issues by *964 arguing for the reversal of Ker-Frisbie or for the use of human rights law. Significantly, but not surprisingly, he instead engaged the majority directly on treaty grounds, without much success.
A. An Assault on Ker-Frisbie A frontal assault on Ker-Frisbie would have essentially recapitulated the evolution of criminal procedure in the twentieth century. In light of the revolution in due process jurisprudence since Ker, due process arguably ought to cover not only searches but also arrests, both domestic and extraterritorial. After all, the differences between seizures of things and persons are not significant, as a matter of policy or constitutional law, and nothing short of the divestiture of jurisdiction-a counterpart to the exclusionary rule-will deter improper arrests. Ker remains an archaic remainder of an era before the constitutional regulation of criminal law enforcement. [FN125] Finally, whatever its merits as policy, the Ker-Frisbie jurisdiction rule is only minimally supported by the Ker case itself. [FN126] In short, the time for Ker's reversal is ripe, even overdue. The problem is that courts have been extremely reluctant to scuttle, or even modify, Ker-Frisbie. However distasteful the rule is to academic critics, federal and state courts have almost unanimously endorsed the rule. [FN127] When the Second Circuit appeared to be sniping at the edges of Ker-Frisbie in the 1970s, [FN128] the Supreme Court broadly affirmed the Ker-Frisbie rule three times (although not in the treaty or foreign abduction contexts).
[FN129] *965 Reversal of Ker-Frisbie was thus highly unlikely. In fact, even the modest strategy of distinguishing Ker on the facts, which the Alvarez-Machain lower court and dissent attempted, was soundly rejected by the majority. [FN130] The second potential criminal law argument would have asserted that trials of abductees from other countries should be ruled invalid using the judiciary's inherent supervisory power, which allows federal courts to dismiss abusive prosecutions as a last resort. In abduction cases, commentators have called for the use of this power, defendants have invoked it, and the lower courts (including the district court in Alvarez-Machain) have alluded to it in dicta. [FN131] But no court has ever squarely relied on its supervisory power in an abduction case, [FN132] and the Supreme Court has sharply restricted the doctrine, stating that it constitutes an unwarranted extension of judicial power.
[FN133] Moreover, the unsavory charges against Alvarez Machain ensured that arguments invoking the supervisory power were unlikely to find a sympathetic audience. The courts need not defer to discretionary Executive Branch acts like abduction without *966 examining alleged extradition treaty violations. Moreover, Rauscher generously construes the presumptive aim of regulating rendition, even for inconclusive treaties. [FN136] Finally, Rauscher addresses the abductee's claim without requiring protest by his asylum country, [FN137] providing the individual a desirable remedy, repatriation. [FN138] In short, reliance on Rauscher seemed to offer a very strong case for the dissent-if only it could be made to fit. At best, however, Rauscher would only support a narrow holding in favor of Dr. Alvarez Machain, creating an exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule by favoring nationals of a country that has signed an extradition treaty with the United States. The logic of Rauscher would not extend to abductions from the seventy countries with which the United States has no extradition treaty, [FN139] nor would it reach abductions from the ship of a country that has not acceded to the Convention of the High Seas, [FN140] or instances where the defendant is lured onto an American vessel or American soil. [FN141] Rauscher might also permit abductions of stateless persons, at least those lacking official status from some national or international institution. In addition, Rauscher's theoretical underpinnings are inconsistent with respect to the notion of customary norms. The case correctly states that treaties must be construed in accordance with customary norms, such as the specialty rule. But these customary norms also include male captus, bene detentus. [FN142] Applying customary norms to treaties allows a Trojan horse to enter Rauscher's gates. Although Rauscher mandates a remedy for the individual, its logic compels that the opposing norm (male captus) also be considered. To escape this destructive logic, human rights law must be invoked. Rauscher's greatest problem is its failure to define the term "treaty violation," despite its threshold requirement that such a violation occur. The Rauscher majority found it "apparent" and "very clear" from "the entire face of the treaty" that despite its conspicuous absence from the text of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, the specialty doctrine was incorporated into the treaty nonetheless. Any other result, the Court held, would violate the "manifest scope and object of the treaty." [FN143] But proving such violations is difficult where no guidelines for defining them exist. What, then, is the basis for finding a violation? The likelihood that one has occurred? The reasonableness *967 of finding a violation? How can a rule against abductions be read into a treaty when the Court interpreting the treaty is unwilling to hear arguments based on likelihood or reasonableness?
C. The Human Rights Paradigm The dissent could have avoided Rauscher's shortcomings by relying on the authority of human rights law, which, as various amici argued, contains an emerging new norm against foreign forcible abduction.
[FN144] This new norm focuses on the wrongs (abduction and trial) suffered by the individual, and differs from male captus by treating the abduction as a wrong requiring an individual remedy. Although the new norm is definitely present in modern international law, it is still unclear whether it has supplanted male captus. If the norm is firmly incorporated into American law, the dissent would have a powerful argument against abduction. Under the human rights theory, Alvarez Machain's claim would neither depend on proof of official involvement (required by the lower courts) [FN145] nor would it fail based on either the language of the treaty or Mexico's tacit consent to Ker-Frisbie. Reliance on human rights law rather than Rauscher would provide a remedy for any abduction that occurred outside a sovereign's territory. The validity of such claims would not depend on the excessive violence of the abduction as required by the high threshold of the Toscanino test. Nor would the claim be limited to nationals of treaty partners or obscured by the alleged consent of corrupt local officials. Most important, an individual right against abduction based in human rights law would negate the need for protest by the abductee's country. [FN146] The protest requirement is problematic because it forces the asylum state to weigh an individual's complaint against other bilateral foreign policy issues, usually to the individual's disadvantage. Under human rights law, the variables of the abduction would be irrelevant. Foreign abduction alone would be sufficient to trigger a remedy. The human rights norm would also help to reconcile abduction claims with post-World War II public international law. This body of law has increasingly recognized that many rights belong to individuals as individuals, *968 not as members of nation-states. Foundational post-war legal texts demonstrate the centrality of individual rights. [FN147] Acknowledgement that the right not to be abducted or tried afterward lies with the individual rather than with his country would provide equal treatment of similar defendants for the differing treatment afforded by the current tiered categories of aliens. Moreover, this approach would be consistent with the individual right against abduction by one's own country, as well as with other recognized human rights such as protection against prolonged, arbitrary detention. [FN148] Finally, the human rights norms shift the focus from citizenship, treaty term, and official protest to the core issue of police behavior and the individual. In this regard, human rights law would surpass due process analysis, taking a bolder position than current conceptions of our Constitution allow. The dissent failed to utilize the valid legal basis of human rights law to articulate its revulsion at abduction, choosing instead, like the majority, to view Alvarez-Machain primarily as a treaty case. The majority probably addressed treaties to avoid the remote possibility that foreign abductees from America's treaty partners would be "privileged." [FN149] For its part, the dissent likely focused on treaties in the hope that treaty law would provide an alternative to Ker-Frisbie, and would at least protect those pers ons abducted in the face of a treaty. The treaty permitted the dissent to avoid the "squishiness" of customary norms and the Pandora's box of "controlling executive ... act s ." [FN150] Perhaps the dissent also chose the treaty argument for the more pressing reason that other arguments were, for practical purposes, unavailable. Due process analysis, requiring a frontal assault on Ker-Frisbie, was politically impossible, and arguments grounded in human rights law have never been welcomed in American courts. With its origins in natural law theory, human rights law feels fuzzy and moralistic; because human rights law is embodied in conventions and other instruments, it strikes American judges as presumptuously positivistic. Thus, the majority relied on the treaty and Ker while the dissent focused on the treaty and Rauscher. A universe of legal issues was reduced to one treaty and two cases decided on the same day a century ago.
V. Some Practical Consequences of Alvarez-Machain
A. The Abduction Free-for-All Scenario Critics have focused on the practical dangers of abductions in the aftermath *969 of Alvarez-Machain. Will America become a rogue nation, abducting fugitives at will? Even if we accept Executive Branch assurances that abduction will be confined to extreme cases, there could be many such seizures. A speculative American "wish-list" of persons whose extradition to the United States has been expressly refused could include: Medellin and Cali drug lords; Abu Abbas, released by Italy after the Achille Lauro hijacking and murder; Mohammad Ali Hamadi, tried in Germany for a lesser offense in lieu of trial in America for a murder committed during a hijacking; Marc Rich and Pincus Green, fugitive commodities traders; Libyan intelligence officers accused of planning the murder of Pan Am passengers over Lockerbie; and Robert Vesco, whose proposed seizure prompted the Carter Administration to restrict foreign abduction in the first place. [FN151] The list is an all-star gallery of international rogues sheltered by countries friendly, hostile, and indifferent to American interests. What will happen when an operation goes awry and local police exchange gunfire with American agents on foreign soil? The other practical concern is the potential for abductions from America by foreign governments. [FN152] Fugitives and refugees from a variety of countries and circumstances find sanctuary in the United States. State-sponsored murders of dissidents in America by Chile and the Republic of China underscore the willingness of foreign regimes to pursue political assassination on American soil. [FN153] Would such regimes shrink from abduction? [FN154] Within days of Alvarez-Machain, the Iranian government reaffirmed its readiness to abduct Americans accused of violating Iranian law. Possible abduction targets among the Iranian emigre community or the Pahlavi family are obvious, [FN155] but not all fugitives are ousted politicians, to whom international law and Executive Branch discretion might provide heightened protection. The post-Alvarez-Machain announcement by U.K. Attorney General Sir Nicholas Ewell that the British government had despaired of obtaining John DeLorean by extradition from America illustrates the hypothetical possibilities. [FN156] The prospect of reciprocal international lawlessness has been at the heart of criticism of Alvarez-Machain. America abducts abroad, and other countries will abduct from here. Thus, when District of Columbia U.S. Attorney Jay Stephens announced the indictment of chess champion Bobby Fischer for violating U.N. economic sanctions against Serbia, he quickly added that he did not foresee abducting Fischer. [FN157] At the logical extreme, everyone will abduct everywhere, an autarkic free-for-all in which each country grabs whomever it wants badly enough to face the political risks. This critique entirely misapprehends the consequences of Alvarez-Machain. Although press reports immediately after Alvarez-Machain disclosed a small wave of abductions by America, this was probably the regular level of drug-related abductions, made newsworthy by the Supreme Court's decision. [FN158] As President Bush stated in the first days after AlvarezMachain, abductions will occur only rarely. [FN159] This is not, however, because the Executive or Judicial Branches take treaties or international law seriously, but because of prudential policy considerations. The reasons are obvious: Every abduction involves spending political capital, so each operation must either be deniable or perfectly executed. Private kidnappers are also aware that if an abduction is not perfectly executed or is later discovered, they may be extradited to face kidnapping charges. For similar prudential reasons, foreign governments are unlikely to kidnap from American soil. The prospect of American retaliation, political or military, makes abduction rarely worth the effort. In addition, the infrequent occurrence of abductions is unlikely to unleash *971 a Doomsday scenario of reciprocal kidnappings and reprisals. The abducting country may face nominal censure, as did Israel after the Eichmann abduction. [FN160] On rare occasions the receiving state will repatriate the abductee, as the United States did after the Jaffe abduction, [FN161] or pay some form of monetary compensation. [FN162] Most often, the abducting country will stonewall or offer bland reassurances, as the United States did after Alvarez Machain's abduction. [FN163] The aggrieved state typically will accept the abduction and swallow the insult to its sovereignty, realizing that occasional abductions are rarely important enough to jeopardize international interests. Consider the political aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain case. Mexicans in and out of government fiercely denounced the United States.
[FN164] The government of Mexico called for treaty amendments, threatened to halt drug control cooperation, and filed complaints with the Organization of American States and other institutions. In addition, a Mexican patrol entered U.S. territory to arrest a fugitive without consent, perhaps in symbolic reprisal. [FN165] But the proposed free trade treaty has not been scuttled, nor have the fundamental economic and immigration relationships between the two countries been weakened.
B. The Real Significance of Alvarez-Machain: The Imperial Presidency
The real significance of Alvarez-Machain lies not in its impact on international policing, but in its effect on American law and politics. The possibility of foreign abduction by United States officials forces Americans to consider how police should be regulated, defendants treated, and the Executive Branch limited in its conduct of foreign relations. Should abductions, however few, be subject only to prudential considerations, or should they be regulated by law? If regulation is appropriate, what form should it take? How the political branches and the public respond to these questions will say much about the current configuration of American constitutionalism.
1. Restraining the Executive: the realist critique. One possible response to the case is to reject a legal framework in favor of a "realist" approach that measures abductions only against national interest. Foreign-policy realists are appalled by the notion that international law could restrain American interests. [FN166] After all, they note, few other states, *972 especially powerful ones, are so scrupulous. Forget moralism and international law, they write (and often do when in office). Forget even the possibility acknowledged in Alvarez-Machain that, under a different treaty or clearer international norms, a state might be bound to repatriate a defendant or barred from abducting in the first place. The very notion of a state bound by normative or contractual obligations in a Hobbesian world is absurd to the realists. States should do only what they perceive as being in their best interests. Statecraft might be the business of white-shoe lawyers turned diplomats, but it is divorced from the strange and academic system called public international law. Realists and international lawyers often agree on policy, but realists reject the independent normative claims of international law, accepting it only when it makes sense from a tactical or public relations standpoint. Since World War II, respected scholars including Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz have espoused realist analyses of international relations. [FN167] Moreover, realist diplomats, including George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, have occupied the highest American foreign policy positions. These scholars and statesmen agreed that a great power must be free to pursue its interests, although they frequently differed on how to define those interests. Legal accretions, such as the Nuremberg war crimes trials, proposals for a new international criminal court, the Third-World majoritarian United Nations, and the International Bill of Rights all arouse distrust among realists. Their skepticism turns to ridicule when confronted with more unusual claims of international law, such as the notion that peacetime spying or nuclear armament is "illegal." [FN168] So persuasive is the realist perspective that, to the chagrin of many international lawyers, even American leaders firmly grounded in the tradition of legal-minded liberal internationalism, such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Stimson, Jimmy Carter, and Cyrus Vance, have willingly subordinated international legal concerns to diplomatic objectives and domestic political realities. Under a realist analysis, abductions necessary to protect the national interest are perfectly appropriate. Any limits on this activity should derive from American statutory and constitutional law and the pressures of domestic public opinion and not international law, even if the latter is formally incorporated into American law. Note that realism is not the equivalent of "anything goes"; America is free to limit its own policy options through *973 domestic law. [FN169] Realism focuses on domestic restraints on American activities abroad, ignoring the external limits embodied in international law. How should international lawyers respond? Viewing realism as the gratuitous replacement of law with gutter values is profoundly misguided. Realism's logic is too powerful for even the most idealistic statesmen to ignore. If law does not recognize power it will be marginalized, as international law has been for much of this century. There are two substantive responses to the realist critique. First, the creation of a strong body of international law, even with its associated limitations on state sovereignty, can powerfully serve America's foreign policy interests. International law promotes stability, security, and, since World War II, human rights. The United States has strong security and economic interests in maintaining an orderly world and in achieving meaningful norms of peaceful state behavior. Second, realism typically slights the need for meaningful restraints on Executive Branch discretion in foreign affairs, which has increased substantially since the start of World War II. In theory, realists recognize the need to proceed through constitutional channels. In practice, at least during the Cold War, their insistence that effective foreign policy required speedy and secret decisionmaking meant that their criteria for reasonable constitutional restraints were far too loose. [FN170] One important lesson of the Vietnam War is that the Executive Branch must not be given excessive leeway in foreign affairs. The President's claim of exclusive jurisdiction over American foreign policy and the increasing secrecy surrounding that leadership threaten our commitment to a limited, constitutional government. In this context, there is ample reason to consider Alvarez-Machain a dangerous blank check for the Executive. Equally ominous is the tendency for operations like the Alvarez Machain abduction to be planned and carried out at the governmental grass-roots level. Abduction thus represents a double delegation of power: first to the Executive Branch, then to the bureaucracies of the DEA or FBI. Any possibility of meaningful oversight is lost. Regardless of whether one is generally persuaded that broad Executive Branch discretion is dangerous, the Executive triggers oversight when it calls on the courts to resolve and legitimate events begun by extraterritorial abduction. It is preferable to abduct foreign defendants for trial than to assassinate them. Alvarez Machain won at trial, and General Noriega had a chance to win. Che Guevara had no trial and no chance. Because world *974 opinion is likely to view the trial process as a fair means of resolving issues, the Executive Branch benefits from allowing the courts to consider foreign seizures. But invoking a judicial rather than military paradigm to placate world opinion has drawbacks as well. Few judges would willingly rubber-stamp presidential foreign-policy initiatives or preside at the sham trials of abducted aliens. Furthermore, relying on the criminal model involves the possibility of acquittal, some measure of accountability to the judicial and legal communities, and adherence to rules that a disgruntled Congress can, and perhaps will, modify. 2. Reform proposals to limit abduction. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court, having spoken on abductions in Alvarez-Machain, will have the last word. The Court held only that abduction is not prohibited by the treaty with Mexico and that courts retain jurisdiction over an abductee. Critics of this view can try to change the law. Indeed, the effort has already begun. What are these potential reforms? According to the Court, modifying the treaty to expressly preclude abduction might suffice. Mexico supports this option, [FN171] but the Executive Branch is unlikely to relinquish what it has just won from the Court. Mexico has also requested the extradition of Alvarez Machain's kidnappers, for which there is American precedent, [FN172] but the Executive Branch is unlikely to permit the rendition of its own employees or those who aided them. Another means of regulating abductions is to permit abductees to file tort actions on constitutional, human rights, or common law grounds. Ker expressly mentioned this possibility.
[FN173] Moreover, when the Ker-Frisbie rule appeared shaky in the 1970s, conservatives argued that accepting the sanction of civil damages was preferable to releasing the abductee. [FN174] Verdugo Urquidez and other abductees have brought civil suits, and press reports indicate that Alvarez Machain may do the same.
[FN175] Recent case law, however, *975 seems to discourage foreign Bivens actions, [FN176] and even successful civil suits are unlikely to affect abduction policy. Civil liability has rarely succeeded in controlling domestic police practices; its inadequacy and that of similar alternatives is the chief justification for the exclusionary rule. A third alternative is Executive Branch adoption of internal guidelines requiring high-level approval for any abduction. Public comments by several leading officials, however, suggest that such guidelines already exist-raising questions about their efficacy. [FN177] Although top officials certainly approved the abduction of General Noriega, it is unclear whether they were involved in the decision to abduct Alvarez Machain or others implicated in the killing of DEA Agent Camarena. More important than whether senior Executive Branch officials consider a pending abduction is what criteria they use and whether the process itself can be monitored. As a result, critics of Alvarez-Machain have looked to Congress for reform. [FN178] One pending bill would forbid prosecution of persons abducted by U.S. officials against a treaty and with state protest. [FN179] Legislation could easily go farther, unqualifiedly forbidding foreign abduction. Some observers have even suggested that legislation expressly incorporate the international norms against seizure and the use of extraterritorial force. [FN180] Alternatively, the Federal Kidnapping Act might be amended to clarify the criminal liability of officially supported abductors-a possibility considered by the Frisbie Court.
[FN181] Congress might also limit the authority of the FBI or the DEA. But any legislative strategy aimed at the Executive Branch collides with the allegedly inherent and almost limitless constitutional authority of the President to enforce the law and conduct foreign relations. [FN182] Proposals should instead focus on the courts, divesting them of jurisdiction over abductees where a treaty and foreign protest is involved, or even under *976 any circumstances. [FN183] Finally, a number of critics have used the abduction controversy to promote or revive the notion of an international criminal court with sole or concurrent jurisdiction over foreign abductees. [FN184] Regardless of the dubious merits of such a court, in the context of abduction both Congress and the American public are certain to ignore such a proposal. Some skepticism regarding legislative remedies is in order. On a practical level, regulating police behavior is problematic at best. Courts already have trouble supervising domestic police activities. Only a "bright-line" statute banning all foreign abduction, or all abduction with our treaty partners, might end foreign kidnapping. A more permissive rule granting jurisdiction after abduction by private figures or foreign police would face inherent oversight difficulties, magnified by the fact that the activities occurred abroad. A ban forbidding only official and joint public-private kidnappings might delegate abductions to private freelancers. A law permitting abduction as a last resort, or only if certain legal findings were made, could result in pro forma claims that the required alternatives had been exhausted and the predicate facts found. To illustrate the difficulty of regulating extraterritorial policies, consider the Mansfield Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. [FN185] First enacted in 1976, the Amendment sought to limit U.S. involvement in foreign drug crime enforcement. The Amendment is widely viewed as a failure, lacking sanctions or other mechanisms. Its porous terms are easily circumvented, and where it does apply, it is frequently ignored by aggressive agents. [FN186] In the Caro-Quintero drug outfit cases, including Alvarez-Machain, the Mansfield Amendment was inapplicable apparently because the investigations were related to murder rather than drug trafficking. Ironically, even in the absence of an effective statute, the high cost and complexity of foreign kidnapping place real constraints on discretionary abductions. [FN187] Of course, appropriation limitations will not affect private *977 bounty-hunters or the abduction of easy targets. Many seizures, however, are possible only with the intelligence and logistical support of government agencies and resources. And, as memories of the failed Iran hostage rescue demonstrate, there is no margin of error for government seizures. Seizing even a well-connected lesser figure may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Dr. Alvarez Machain's abduction required the payment of $20,000 of a $50,000 promised reward, the evacuation to America of seven kidnappers and their families, weekly stipends of $6000 for the kidnappers and their families in the first two months alone, and such intangibles as favorable visa status. [FN188] The seizure of a mid-level terrorist like Lebanese hijacker Fawaz Yunis in 1988 involved five government agencies, foreign contractors, rented houses and boats, a naval communications ship, and an aircraft carrier.
[FN189] Abducting a Cali drug kingpin or a major Middle Eastern terrorist chief would require even more elaborate machinations (recall the probable cost in lives and money of arresting General Noriega). The cost, complexity, and possibility of humiliating failure often might provide precisely the check on Executive Branch adventurism that the Supreme Court declined to furnish.
VI. CONCLUSION: JUSTIFIED ABDUCTIONS IN LIMITED CONTEXTS
In the previous section I joined the widespread call for regulation of foreign abduction in the form of legislation divesting the courts of jurisdiction over abductees. I asserted that an aggressive Executive Branch often claims the right to abduct without deference to legislative or judicial oversight, and I implied that the Executive Branch has exercised that discretion unwisely-the abduction of Alvarez Machain offers one prime example. I want to close by noting that some cases might exist where foreign abduction is legitimate and should be permitted under American law. While I remain fearful that the Executive Branch will often run amok given any authority to abduct, I nevertheless want to articulate my own narrow set of exceptions. Underlying these examples is the question of whether an exception can be defined with sufficient neutrality and precision to prevent the abduction of whichever fugitive is the "threat-of-the-month." Thus, the legal question ought to be not whether the president has the authority to abduct under American foreign relations law, but whether there are generally accepted principles *978 that provide meaningful guidance to the Executive Branch and legitimacy under international law when the president chooses to exercise this authority. The analysis begins with the general rule that forcible foreign abduction violates the law. Under this presumption, Alvarez Machain's abduction would be impermissible. But there are cases where the government presents a more compelling claim. Consider, for example, seven categories that might qualify. First, there is the unimaginably evil fugitive, typically a despotic political leader or mass killer-an Eichmann exception. [FN190] There would be some controversy over identifying precisely which lesser demons reside in this particular circle of hell: Idi Amin? Klaus Barbie? A local Serbian commander in Bosnia, circa 1992? The intent is to define a narrow class based on international legal criteria, excluding the ordinary apolitical murderer or, more pertinently, the alleged torture-murderer of a DEA agent. A second exception might be made for a fugitive abducted from the territory of a state no longer functioning as a sovereign country. This description might have applied to Lebanon in the 1980s or to Peru at the time of the Ker case. [FN191] A third special case is that of a fugitive who worked for, or was controlled by, an asylum state which is unlikely to surrender him. Examples include Chile's shielding nationals accused in the Letelier-Moffitt murder or Libyan protection of two officials accused in the Pan Am 103 bombing. Malefactor heads of state like General Noriega by extension would also meet this criterion. The fourth category involves a fugitive located within a country which refuses to make good faith efforts to arrest a known defendant and bring him to justice. Many defenders of the Alvarez Machain abduction shored their position by arguing that "the Mexicans were never going to prosecute." [FN192] *979 A fugitive whose recovery is required by overriding national interest would be a fifth category. Of course, a category defined by state exigency is dangerously and inevitably open to abuse. Legitimate cases might include abducting an active terrorist or a spy en route to meet his handler. The individual brought out of foreign sanctuary not by force, but by trickery, comprises the sixth case. Certain jurists have regarded "force or fraud" as equally violative of the nonabduction norm, [FN193] but persuasive distinctions can be drawn between the two cases. In luring a defendant, American enforcement neither directly violates the territorial sovereignty of the asylum state nor risks excessive violence to the abductee or third parties. Examples of defendants enticed from sanctuary include Edwin Wilson and Fawaz Yunis; multiple attempts were reportedly made to lure Alvarez Machain before his abduction. [FN194] The final situation involves an American fugitive charged with a crime in the United States, like Frederick Ker. A permissive rule here would allow a state to abduct one of its own nationals for a crime committed within its own territory, particularly where a fair trial and conviction have already occurred. The preceding list is intended to be illustrative of some of the strongest rationales for abduction. Nevertheless, the list underscores the difficulty of framing neutral criteria for abduction, for few of these scenarios are sufficiently limited, compelling, or legally manageable. From a realist's perspective, the second category creates an exception for a few particularly chaotic states while ignoring the reality that most non-Western states are institutionally weak and susceptible to pressure. The human rights analysis also rejects the second category, as individual protection should not depend on statist criteria. But the second category might be easily used under present political conditions to sanction abduction from almost any Andean or Central American country. The seventh category offers a dubious, inverted version of Verdugo-Urquidez, in which any American resident is abductable. The fourth category implies that forcible self-help is an appropriate response to a supposed failure to extradite or prosecute. It also implies that treaty partners are not entitled to decline to extradite their own nationals. The fourth category simply characterizes the refusal to take "no" for an answer, regardless of good faith or cooperation in other cases. [FN195] Even the persuasive first and fifth categories, designed to include genocidal killers and active, imminent *980 threats to national security, are easily expanded from Eichmann and Benedict Arnold to narcoterrorists, and even to an alleged torture-murderer of a DEA agent. Even with these limited exceptions, the general norm against abductions could easily collapse. Any serious attempt to define permissible abduction must, however, address the possibilities of overriding humanitarian and security exigencies. Legitimate cases of national emergency do arise, albeit rarely in a secure country like ours, and accepting the international system of sovereign states implies that a sovereign retains the right to protect itself in these extreme cases. Current American law is of little help here; the Executive Branch invokes its constitutional discretion and Alvarez-Machain ignores abduction as policy, permitting jurisdiction over any abducted individual. International law, however, offers a more nuanced basis for supporting an abduction exception for heinous crimes and national emergencies. Although international law generally forbids the use of foreign force, it does permit countries to use force in self-defense, which may include anticipatory self-defense. As applied to abductions, the "emergency" self-defense rationale would permit the kidnapping of persons whose continued freedom posed a grave threat to national security (the foreign leader plotting for war against us, or the active terrorist). In such cases, abduction is a more precise, limited, and thus preferable option than the alternative of full-scale war. This rationale might also permit the abduction of the two Libyan agents implicated in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. [FN196] But self-defense, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or other international law, has never been interpreted as a license to use lesser levels of force in the pursuit of strongly sought ends, however virtuous. [FN197] On the contrary, self-defense and related rationales have always assumed an overwhelming exigency for which only a military response would suffice. In practice, application of these criteria is extremely controversial, but consensus on some points has formed. States do not have the right to respond to every instance of treaty breach, aggression, or criminality with forcible self-defense. Hence, the asserted "self-defense" rationale for invading Panama and removing General Noriega was singularly unpersuasive. [FN198] Similarly, a *981 country's right to launch a military response does not imply a discretionary right to police one's neighbor. The self-defense justification applies in the context of invasion and national survival, not as an attempt to ensure individual accountability for foreign crimes. Indeed, the chief problem with self-defense as applied to criminal enforcement is that the exigency inherent in national security may lead the Executive Branch to abduct suspects without sufficient legal evidence of guilt, as it did in the case of Alvarez Machain. Self-defense may justify the seizure of foreign agents, but it is unlikely to permit the apprehension of routine foreign criminals, however notorious. A second internationally recognized rationale for abductions applies where the abductee is an especially heinous criminal. In the case of genocidal political leaders like Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic, the "humanitarian intervention" theory permits both full-scale war and the lesser response of abduction. Broader still is the theory of universal jurisdiction, which concerns the class of heinous crimes, including piracy, slave-trading, and genocide, over which all states are deemed to have jurisdiction. [FN199] Under either a humanitarian intervention or universal jurisdiction standard, countries might be permitted to secure personal jurisdiction through abduction. [FN200] The applicability of either theory would depend on the gravity of the offenses and the role of the offender. Moreover, it must dis tinguish between such extraordinary cases as Eichmann and Milosevic, on the one hand, and the recent American drug abductions on the other. [FN201] But neither humanitarian intervention nor universal jurisdiction provides a narrow, airtight, and uniformly accepted list of crimes for which abduction is permissible. After all, humanitarian intervention was long in legal disfavor, precisely because of its potential breadth of application. [FN202] Universal jurisdiction is still an evolving category, the current scope of which might permit too many abductions. For example, if universal jurisdiction includes the crime of apartheid, are former South African officials abductable? Would African states have been entitled, under universal jurisdiction, to abduct American segregationist leaders, as Hannah Arendt wondered? [FN203] Our commitment to the reciprocal application of neutral principles would have been sorely strained if Governor George Wallace had been abducted or if the former Yugoslavia had kidnapped war criminal Andrij Artukovic, whose *982 extradition was delayed for thirty years because of Cold War tensions. [FN204] The jurisdictional bases of hijacking are also problematic. The act is recognized as an international crime, but only partly on the basis of universality.
[FN205] Are Cubans who hijack planes to Miami fair game for abduction under the theory of universal jurisdiction? Universal jurisdiction creates a category of abductable offenses that is relatively short and morally appealing, but is still overbroad and unclear. Another problem with abduction for universal crimes is the vast number of potential abductees and defendants. The essence of modern genocide is the use of the state apparatus and its thousands of complicitous individuals. May we abduct the assistants, the planners, the collaborators, and the suppliers who staff the state machinery? Torture is currently perpetrated in many countries. If we are serious about prosecuting universal crimes, scores of states and their leaders are fair game. But of course we have no intention of abducting any of these persons for trial. On the contrary, the United States has often supported these governments. Pursuing selective abductions and trials would expose moral inconsistency in an area of law that is supposedly grounded in moral unanimity. At the same time, universal jurisdiction is too narrow for the apparent needs of statecraft. Almost no recent American abduction would be covered by the doctrine. Yet perhaps an exception for abductions ought to be precisely that narrow-limited to the most extraordinary defendants and circumstances. If national emergency and universal criminality are constricting tests for the state, so be it. Countries will continue to try to abduct alleged criminals; it would be convenient if the law could endorse those actions. But no foreseeable application of existing theory would characterize the alleged torturer-murderer of a drug agent as an enemy of all mankind or as an imminent threat to American security. Nothing less would satisfy international lawyers that Dr. Alvarez Machain was abducted legally. Despite the likelihood that humanitarian intervention and universal jurisdiction will be invoked in dubious cases, these two rationales provide powerful support, as well as a framework, for foreign abductions. In rare appropriate cases, this framework would permit the prudent pursuit of the national interest and would reconcile the extraterritorial extension of force with both widely accepted traditional international law and newer human rights norms. Equally important, utilizing humanitarian and universal *983 crimes rationales would offer a principled alternative to the present American practice, which places the entire question within presidential purview. Alvarez-Machain, whose supporters view it as a narrow ruling on jurisdictional grounds, is actually a broad delegation of the sort of power that has allowed swashbuckling presidents to act without restraint or consultation in the past. And given the inclinations of the Alvarez-Machain Court, America's conception of legality will continue to stretch as far as the abductor's grasp. [FN6]. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
[FN7]. The account of the facts, which the Supreme Court accepted, is taken from the district court's evidentiary hearing of May 25, 1990 and its opinion of August 14, 1990. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601-04.
